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Angle of Ball in Play by Pitch Type and Speed
Last week I looked at the horizontal angle of a ball in play as a function of the location in the zone where it was hit. Although there is some trend for lower pitches to be pulled more, most of the trend is dictated by the horizontal location of the pitch. As expected inside pitches tend to be hit to the pull field and outside pitches more to the opposite field. Below I reproduce the trend for just the horizontal location. I found the average angle of a ball in play as a function of the horizontal location of the pitch. The center of the strike zone is 0 and negative numbers indicate pitches that are inside to right hand batters and positive numbers outside. The strike zone extends from -1 (inside edge to a RHB ) to 1 (outside edge to a RHB). The angle of a ball in play follows the -45/0/45 convention (-45 is the third base line, 0 2nd base and 45 the first base line), so negative numbers indicate the pull field for a righty.
Starting away and moving towards the batter more and more balls are pulled, with the trend slowing and stopping at about the inside edge of the plate. Here you can see the overall pull tendency. At x=0, the middle of the plate, the average ball is hit to about 7.5° to the pull field and at x=1, the outside edge of the plate, the average ball is hit right up the middle. I was interested in how this varied by pitch type. I expected that slower pitches would be pulled more, as hitter have more time to 'get around' on such pitches.
The results confirm our expectations. The slower a pitch type the more it is pulled, so that through much of the strike zone the average curveball or changeup is pulled 10° more than the average fastball in the same horizontal location. This shows part of the danger of coming inside with breaking and off-speed pitches. These pitches, if they are hit, will tend to be pulled heavily, which is where most hitters have the greatest power. I also wanted to see how much speed affected pull, regardless of pitch type. Here I plot the average angle of a ball in play by pitch speed for three horizontal locations, away (but in the zone), down the middle and inside (but in the zone).
The effect of pitch speed is strong, nonlinear and interacts with location. So for inside pitches there is not much effect of speed, the pull rate of a very slow and very fast pitch are not that far off. Similarly there is not a lot of difference in the pull rate of very slow pitches across location, they are all pulled heavily. But outside pitches are strongly affected by pitch speed, with slow ones being pulled and fast ones going to the opposite field. And very fast pitches are strongly influenced by location, with inside ones being pulled and outside ones going to the opposite field. The results here are not that surprising, but nicely confirm long-held baseball expectations.
Team Draft Success: Calculating the Effect of a General Manager's Drafting Ability (WAR and the Draft Part 3)
This is the third part of what has been a three part series on the MLB Draft. Part one created a model for the expected value of each draft pick, while part two calculated probabilities of becoming a certain caliber player, as well as expanded on the conclusions in part one. Today's article focuses on individual teams and how much control they have over the draft process. Is drafting more or less a complete crapshoot, or does the success of a draft vary greatly depending on the front office and the team who is doing the drafting (and oftentimes developing the players as well). Is there much to distinguish a great drafting franchise from a poor one, or is the difference mostly due to luck? To review, the data I had at hand was gleaned from Sean Smith's WAR database and Baseball Reference, and contained overall picks #1-50, as well as a handful of picks after that (every 5th pick through #100, every 10th pick through #500, and every 25th pick through #1000). While not every pick for every team is covered, this data gives each team a sample of well over 100 draft picks, including all of a team's very high selections. Data used in this study, will focus only on each player's "first six year" WAR, since the team only gains from drafting a valuable player during the years in which it does not have to pay market value. The data is also limited to those players drafted in 2001 or earlier, since more recently drafted players have not had a chance to come up and show their full value. Draft WAR By Team So, how did the teams fare? For what it's worth, the table below shows team's drafts based on the sample of picks which I have (which includes all top picks and a smattering of picks after that). As you can see, the Red Sox are the clear #1, while the Padres, Cubs, and Rangers rank near the bottom. As a Cubs fan, the news comes as no surprise, since for nearly all of my first several years of following the team (I started following in 1987), the Cubs never seemed to have a home grown player contribute to meaningfully to the team. Likewise, it seems as though the Red Sox have had an endless array of talent coming up through their farm system. Of course, this still doesn't account for the fact that teams have undoubtedly changed a great deal since 1965, and the philosophy and scouting behind a team's drafting and development strategy when the draft first began likely bears no resemblance to the operation of today. Additionally, the WAR Above Average per Pick value is tough to extrapolate to the entire draft since the data I have is heavy on top picks and those top picks have higher WAR and a higher variability in WAR. While the numbers are interesting, and give a snapshot of how teams have done with their past drafts (again, this is only a sample of picks, not all picks - perhaps another study has shown WAR by team for all picks - if so, that would be superior to the above table), we can't fully get at the question of how large a difference there is between a smart drafting organization and a poor drafting organization without fuller data and a more refined unit of analysis. Draft WAR by General Manager Perhaps more relevant than a team's drafting record is the record of individual general managers. For study this I compared 10 current general managers with substantial draft records dating to back before the 2001 draft. I went back and obtained all picks (not just the sample I previously had) for each of these GM's during their tenure so that I had a substantial amount of data to work with. Comparing each GM's actual WAR to the expected WAR from the model and then comparing the GM's to each other, gives us an idea of how successful each GM has been relative to the others. The table below shows each GM and his drafting record. As you can see, of the 10 GM's studied, Billy Beane is unsurprisingly at the top of the heap, followed closely by Walt Jocketty, former GM of the Cardinals and current GM of the Cincinnati Reds. Bringing up the rear are Brian Cashman of the Yankees and Brian Sabean of the Giants. So, Beane has had good drafts and the Sabean has had bad drafts. Is this a real difference, or is this a simple artifact of luck? To investigate this, we first calculate the weighted variance of the GM's WAR Above Average per pick. This observed weighted variance is .036. Then we calculate the expected weighted variance if all teams were equally good at drafting (with an expected WAR Above Average value of 0 and a SD of 2.0, which is the SD of WAR Above Average over all picks). This expected variance is .013. Taking the square root of the difference of the two variances gives an estimate of the standard deviation of the true drafting talent across GM's. (Observed Variance - Expected Variance due to Noise = True Variance). Calculating this with our numbers tells us that the true distribution of GM talent (including scouting, development, etc.) has a standard deviation of .150 WAR per pick. With each team making about 45 picks per year, this means that the SD of the GM talent over an entire draft is a staggering 6.75 WAR. Basically a good GM will net his team an extra 6 or 7 wins above that of an average GM in a single draft. An outstanding GM (top 3% of all GM's) can net his team 13 wins above that of an average GM. Of course the signs can be reversed when talking about poor GM's. This distribution shows just how valuable a good GM can be. As we can see here, the difference in draft quality is more due to skill than chance (though of course, chance plays a major role), and a good GM and scouting system can make all the difference. According to Moneyball, Billy Beane at one point was to be essentially traded for Kevin Youkilis. While Youkilis has become an outstanding player, the trade would not have been a good one. Beane, in just 4 years of the draft between 1998-2001, brought the A's essentially the equivalent of a Hall of Fame player, giving the A's 46 extra WAR over what the average GM would have been able to acquire. This advantage was gained on his drafting skills alone, not even accounting for his ability to make expert trades or sign free agents. Of course, time will tell how Beane's drafts will turn out during the years that followed the proposed trade, but the point is made - GM's have an enormous impact on a team's successes, even when considering their ability to draft alone. Even when we scale back the WAR Above Average per Pick by about 25% to account for the regression effect (.15 estimated true standard deviation divided by the .20 observed standard deviation = .75), we still find that Beane is good for about 9 extra WAR per draft, while Sabean and Cashman are losing their teams about 9 WAR per draft. Unfortunately, because draft picks take so long to develop, it makes it difficult to tell in "real time" how a GM is doing. However, this short study of 10 current long-time GM's shows us just how valuable a good GM can be.
A Different Sort of Mid-Year Report
It's July 1, three months into the baseball season. With another three months remaining, it's a popular time for mainstream media members and basement dwellers alike to look back and determine their respective all-star teams, evaluate trade needs and look forward to what we might be able to expect the rest of the way. In baseball we have grown accustomed to certain start and end points. The "first half" equals pre-All Star Game. So readily available, monthly splits are now popular. Understandably, the beginning of any given season represents the most widely cited starting point. There have been no shortage of great 10-game stretches by ballplayers in 2009, but remember when Emilio Bonifacio was making an MVP push back in mid-April? One of many gifts that Fangraphs has given baseball enthusiasts is the ability to sort 365-day leaders in any number of statistics. So at the halfway mark of the 2009 season, I am going to take a different approach and put together an All-MLB team of sorts based on players' performances over the last 365 days - more or less a full season's worth of baseball. The only difference is that I will be using start and end points less commonly cited. I will list my three top players since July 1st, 2008 at each position, toss in a starting rotation and then three relievers. You will notice that I highlight wOBA, as good a measure of offensive output as any. It combined on-base and slugging, but in a way that more accurately reflects their true respective values. Whereas OPS weights on-base and slugging equally, wOBA makes the proper adjustments. Its creator, Tom Tango, describes it this way: Do we really need another statistic? Yes, we do. Instead of trying to take two statistics (OBP, SLG) and combine and correct their flaws in the hopes of getting one number, we prefer to start from scratch. Furthermore, by recasting the number onto the OBP scale, it makes it much easier for the reader to get a grasp on the number. wOBA is weighted on-base average (we call it an average rather than a percentage). When you look at wOBA numbers throughout the book, just think OBP, and you’ll be fine. In other words, an average hitter is around 0.340 or so, a great hitter is 0.400 or higher, and a poor hitter would be under 0.300. Without further ado... Catcher
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Mauer .356 .434 .547 .420
McCann .308 .389 .509 .390
Soto .263 .351 .441 .344
Notes: Joe Mauer is your clear leader here. 1st Base
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Pujols .345 .448 .702 .466
Teixeira .309 .414 .591 .425
Youkilis .314 .419 .592 .424
Notes: I can see an argument of Miguel Cabrera over Kevin Youkilis here, since Miggy has played 22 more games than Youk since last July 1. 2nd Base
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Utley .294 .403 .508 .398
Pedroia .320 .388 .467 .378
Kinsler .283 .353 .508 .378
Notes: Ben Zobrist didn't play enough games to get in the mix here but in case you had not noticed, he has been ridiculously awesome this season. 3rd Base
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Wright .331 .417 .537 .413
A-Rod .267 .389 .535 .398
Longoria .291 .366 .553 .391
Notes: Chipper Jones misses this list by a hair. Given how much more durable he has been than A-Rod, Longoria and Chipper, the extent to which David Wright (at least at the plate) has separated himself from the MLB third base pack is notable. Shortstop
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Ramirez .325 .412 .559 .414
Jeter .312 .382 .437 .368
Tulowitzki .287 .367 .471 .354
Notes: There is a real logjam for that third slot. Jose Reyes did not play enough games, while Michael Young, Stephen Drew and Jhonny Peralta are all right there. Left Field
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Braun .305 .383 .564 .406
Ibanez .309 .371 .576 .401
Holliday .292 .387 .479 .386
Note: Matt Holliday edges Jason Bay and Adam Dunn because the latter two don't play any defense. Center Field
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Beltran .314 .400 .523 .399
Hunter .309 .371 .529 .388
Granderson .266 .361 .486 .372
Notes: Due to his standout defense, Matt Kemp may deserve a slot on this list. No matter how you cut it, these three plus Kemp have really separated themselves. Right Field
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Hawpe .315 .396 .560 .405
Choo .306 .403 .508 .398
Ethier .297 .381 .538 .390
Notes: There are a lot of good right fielders in baseball right now. There are a few more players who may have a justified claim to this list. Designated Hitter
AVG OBP SLG wOBA
Thome .253 .382 .517 .385
Huff .305 .359 .529 .373
Lind .306 .361 .501 .369
Note: There is a pretty underwhelming crop of DH's in MLB these days. ====== Starting Pitching
IP K/BB ERA
1. Lincecum 231.1 4.10 2.61
2. Greinke 211.2 5.20 2.68
3. Halladay 233.2 5.91 2.50
4. Sabathia 247.2 3.64 2.58
5. Haren 220.1 6.19 2.98
Notes: I leave Johan Santana off because he lags these guys on his fielding independent numbers and has a high strand rate. Relievers
K/9 K/BB ERA
1. Rivera 10.23 12.50 2.45
2. Broxton 13.13 3.89 2.50
3. Nathan 10.52 4.22 1.38
Notes: Look at Mariano Rivera's K/BB! ====== There's my All-365 team. What would yours look like? Who's going to make a strong push over the next 365 days and show up on this thing next July 1? A couple of Justins - Verlander and Upton - come to mind. As we get set for what is shaping up to be one of the most exciting second halfs in a while, whether looking back or ahead, we definitely welcome your take in the comments section on where things stand at the 2009 midway mark.
The 50th Anniversary of Vin Scully's Greatest Call Ever
"It's a fight, a blow-by-blow verbal battle." - Vin Scully, June 30, 1959 One of the greatest baseball rhubarbs in my lifetime took place 50 years ago today. The "blow-by-blow verbal battle" occurred between two of the biggest rivals in all sports: the San Francisco Giants and the Los Angeles Dodgers, in just their second year on the west coast. The game was played on Tuesday, June 30, 1959 at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum. The paid attendance of 59,312 was the largest Coliseum crowd since Opening Night when 61,552 fans were on hand to watch the St. Louis Cardinals beat the Dodgers, 6-2, while setting a new attendance record for a National League night game. (Interestingly, the Cardinals and Dodgers had set the previous league record on April 25, 1958 when Stan Musial's first Coliseum appearance attracted 60,635.) The Giants and Dodgers were in a virtual tie for second place in the National League, 1.5 games behind the Milwaukee Braves. Milwaukee had beaten the New York Yankees, winners of eight of the prior ten World Series, in seven games to win the championship in 1957, then lost the title in seven games to the same Yankees in 1958. San Francisco had snapped the Dodgers' seven-game winning streak the night before when Jim Davenport and Willie Mays led off the 13th inning with back-to-back home runs en route to a 6-4 victory in what my Dad called "the most thrilling game ever played in the Coliseum" to that point. Mays was to be heard from in more ways than one the following night. Batting second in the lineup, the "Say Hey Kid" slugged his 13th homer of the year (and fifth against the Dodgers) in the third inning to give the Giants a 2-0 lead and, according to Dad's game report in the Press-Telegram the following morning, "almost clouted another in the sixth inning, touching off a 10-minute rhubarb. While the fans hooted and hollered, the umpires changed their ruling twice and finally awarded Mays a ground-rule double. Rigney lodged a protest, but withdrew it after the game." The batted ball was first ruled foul, then a home run and, finally, a double. I'll let Vin Scully, in what I believe is not only his most descriptive call ever but one of the greatest in the history of the game, take over from here. Scully details the ensuing rhubarb, mentioning, in order, Drysdale, Mays, Giants manager Bill Rigney, third base coach Salty Parker, third base umpire Dusty Boggess, Dodgers first baseman Gil Hodges, shortstop Don Zimmer, first base umpire and crew chief Tom Gorman, Dodgers manager Walter Alston, left fielder Wally Moon, home plate umpire Ed Sudol, and Dodgers Vice President Buzzie Bavasi. (The fourth umpire was Stan Landes. He was stationed at second base and was never mentioned in Scully's call of the rhubarb.) Although narrator Steve Bailey says the date was May 30, 1959, the incident actually took place on June 30, 1959. Bailey eloquently introduces the nine-minute clip, "Orchids to Vin Scully for a magnificent description of one of the wildest rhubarbs baseball has ever known."
After John Ramsey, the public address announcer, informed the crowd, amidst boos, of the protest, Bailey concluded the segment, "San Francisco manager Bill Rigney quickly forgot his protest because Sad Sam Jones pitched a one-hit, 2-0 shutout." Jim Gilliam had the only hit, a disputed infield single in the eighth inning. According to Dad, "Gilliam's high chop behind the mound was the cheapest of hits, but a hit it was in the opinion of official scorekeeper Charlie Park. 'I hated to call it,' Park told Jones after the game. But Jones, brushing by and refusing to shake hands with Park, answered, 'I don't think it was a hit, whatever you call it.' "Gilliam's hit bounced over Jones' head and was charged by shortstop Andre Rodgers, who over-ran and fumbled the ball. Park ruled that Gilliam would have beaten the play even if Rodgers had handled the ball cleanly. "Rodgers and Giants manager Bill Rigney said it should have been called an error. 'I thought he called it too soon,' said Rigney with Park a listener in the clubhouse. 'If he had thought about it, he couldn't have called it that way. We'll never know if Rodgers could have thrown him out, but the way Rodgers throws, I think we had a chance.' "Jones, who was aware of his no-hitter all the way, said, 'I thought sure the shortstop would get it. Had he caught the ball, he would have got Gilliam.' Then, turning to a group of questioning reporters, Jones said, 'Why don't you buy yourself another scorekeeper.'" My father was one of the rotating official scorekeepers during his tenure covering the Dodgers and, in fact, was the official scorer during Koufax's perfect game. In an attached piece that accompanied his article, entitled "As Lederer Saw It," he wrote, "It was a hit. Had it happened in the first inning, there would have been no question. It was unfortunate that Jones lost the no-hitter, but it was the right call. I'm happy that I didn't have to make it, but I would have done the same." Gilliam's high chopper was indeed a hit as was Scully's "blow-by-blow verbal battle" of one of the greatest baseball rhubarbs and calls of the past 50 years.
The Week That Was
News and notes from around the college, minor league, and mysterious world of baseball cards: Anthony Ranaudo, Chad Jones, and Louis Coleman combined to hold the powerful Texas offense to nine hits and four runs while Jared Mitchell, the CWS Most Outstanding Player, slugged a three-run home run in the first inning and worked an eight-pitch, lead-off walk in the sixth to spark a five-run rally after the Longhorns had tied the score 4-4 in the fifth. Mitchell, a first-round draft choice of the Chicago White Sox, hit .348 with two homers and seven RBI in Omaha. He and Jones also starred on the LSU football team coached by Les Miles. Although LSU will lose Mitchell, Coleman (5th round, KC), D.J. LeMahieu (2nd, CHC), Ryan Schimpf (5th, TOR), Blake Dean (10th, MIN), and Sean Ochinko (11th, TOR), the Tigers will return Ranaudo, who enters his junior season as perhaps the most highly regarded college pitcher in the nation; plus closer Matty Ott, a first-team All-Freshman; Austin Ross, the No. 3 starter as a sophomore; infielders Tyler Hanover and Austin Nola, a defensive whiz at shortstop; athletic outfielders Leon Landry and Mikie Mahtook; one of the top catchers in Micah Gibbs; and perhaps Jones, who could double as a pitcher/outfielder, if he decides to play baseball next spring. I'm looking forward to seeing Josh Vitters, whom I interviewed two years ago as part of our 2007 draft coverage. Vitters (.316/.351/.535) has cooled down considerably after going on a tear for a couple of weeks last month. Vitters will turn 20 in August and is toiling at Low-A Peoria in the Midwest League, which is one of the toughest minor leagues for hitters. However, Mike Stanton, another Futures Game participant from Southern California, won't turn 20 until November, yet is playing Double-A for Jacksonville in the Southern League. A former tight end who turned down a football scholarship to USC, the young Marlins outfielder is off to a less than auspicious start competing mainly against players 2-4 years older than him but is on the short list of who just may be the best prospect in baseball on the heels of David Price, Matt Wieters, and Tommy Hanson ascending to the big leagues. In an excellent piece on whether pitch recognition and plate discipline can be taught in the minor leagues, ESPN's Peter Gammons wrote the following glowing report on Stanton earlier this month: A great case study is that of 19-year-old Marlins outfielder Mike Stanton, one of the most physically gifted prospects in the game. He is a 6-foot-6, 235-pound speedster who was a second-round pick in 2007, turned his back on a tight end scholarship to USC and hit 39 homers in Single-A last season at the age of 18. There are a number of other top prospects that will be performing in the Futures Game. Be sure to set your DVR if you are unable to watch it live. Update: Tom Meagher in the comments section is correct. Shysterball's Craig Calcaterra has resolved the mystery, confirming via email that Josh Wilker's publisher sent the baseball cards. Wilker is the founder and operator of Cardboard Gods, a fantastic blog focused on none other than baseball cards, complete with photos and stories but lacking the bubble gum sticks that were such a part of the world of collecting cards before the advent of price guides and plastic protectors. |