"The main quality a great third base coach must have is a fast runner." - Rocky Bridges, California Angels coach

"It's frustrating. Your job is not to get in the way of a rally." - Rich Donnelly, Dodgers third base coach after Game 1 of the 2006 NLDS

Most readers will remember what was perhaps the strangest play of the 2006 postseason and for Dodger fans that memory is not a happy one. With runners on first and second and nobody out in the top of the second inning, Dodgers rookie Russell Martin took an inside out cut at a 2-1 fastball from the Mets John Maine and drove it deep to right field. Jeff Kent, the runner on second, apparently didn't see the ball immediately and got an extremely poor jump while J.D. Drew at first base read that the ball was over the head of right fielder Shawn Green and began motoring for second. With Kent finally underway and Drew close on his heels, Green played the ball perfectly off the wall on one hop, relayed to Jose Valentin who threw a one-hopper to Paul Lo Duca just in time to nip a diving Kent at the plate. In the meantime, Drew had not slowed at all and upon turning around a surprised Lo Duca was able to put down the tag as Drew also attempted a head first slide. The result was a double play which proved huge in a 6-5 Mets win.

After the game Dodgers third base coach Rich Donnelly noted that he didn't want to send Kent but saw that with Drew close behind, he'd likely end up with two runners on third and at that point he was hoping for a botched throw. And for some reason, perhaps their proximity or his attention focused on the lead runner, Donnelly did not or was unable to give the stop sign to Drew.

As you'll recall, in part I we laid the groundwork for measuring the contribution of third base coaches (or "coachers" as they were originally termed in the 1870s) in the dimension of waving runners around. This time we'll revisit that framework to make an adjustment for team quality and then attempt to answer the question of whether there is a repeatable skill involved in this aspect of the game.

Contextual Matters?

We left off with the question of whether it is really fair to assign all of a team's baserunning (even the subset of plays discussed in part I) to the third base coach's influence? Keep in mind that failing to advance as frequently as the average runner in various situations, as well as getting thrown out, will both depress EqHAR with the latter being much more costly than the former. Even so, it could be the case that Joey Cora of the White Sox was saddled with extremely slow runners who didn't advance as often as they should or runners who don't take direction very well and run through his signs or even who simply don't hustle. And Dino Ebel of the Angels may be, and in fact is, blessed with a Chone Figgins who regularly scoots home on singles and doubles and never gets caught (Figgins was not thrown out in 56 opportunities and recorded the highest individual EqHAR at 4.93 in 2006).

Because this metric is dependant on the personnel a coach has to work with, an additional step is warranted that acknowledges that dependency. This step involves comparing the opportunities that coaches can be said to have some control over with ones that they do not. If a team is populated with poor baserunners who have trouble advancing or regularly get thrown out in situations where the coach is a spectator, one might argue that those opportunities should serve as the baseline with which we judge the coach. Table 2 shows the results of this recalculation by including the "non-coach" EqHAR opportunities and then including a final column that is the ratio of the Rate for opportunities the coach has influence over to the Rate for the opportunities for which they do not.

Table 2: Third Base Coaches in 2006 Ordered by Ratio

                            Coach         Non-Coach
Team   Name                 Opp   Rate    Opp     OA  EqHAR   Rate  Ratio
TBA    Tom Foley            163   1.15    313     12   -6.6   0.80   1.44
PHI    Bill Dancy           262   1.15    329      5   -1.2   0.96   1.20
BAL    Tom Trebelhorn       296   1.01    400      8   -6.1   0.84   1.20
SFN    Gene Glynn           220   0.95    346      6   -4.7   0.84   1.13
CLE    Jeff Datz            274   0.99    400      7   -3.4   0.91   1.09
SDN    Glenn Hoffman        231   1.00    348      7   -3.2   0.91   1.09
TOR    Brian Butterfield    237   0.99    387      9   -2.9   0.92   1.08
NYN    Manny Acta           228   1.05    293      4   -0.6   0.98   1.07
MIL    Dale Sveum           214   1.01    329     11   -1.7   0.95   1.06
ANA    Dino Ebel            238   1.19    373      9    5.2   1.13   1.06
CHA    Joey Cora            234   0.86    404      9   -7.5   0.81   1.05
COL    Mike Gallego         247   1.03    359     12   -0.8   0.98   1.05
OAK    Ron Washington       245   0.89    372     10   -6.0   0.85   1.04
WAS    Tony Beasley         239   1.03    314      9   -0.3   0.99   1.04
KCA    Luis Silverio        237   1.04    400     13    0.7   1.02   1.02
BOS    DeMarlo Hale         248   0.86    424      8   -7.6   0.85   1.01
SEA    Carlos Garcia        226   0.97    377     13   -0.2   1.00   0.97
SLN    Jose Oquendo         230   0.98    375      9    1.0   1.03   0.95
ARI    Carlos Tosca         275   1.01    332      5    2.0   1.07   0.95
DET    Gene Lamont          240   1.10    362      3    5.5   1.16   0.95
NYA    Larry Bowa           289   0.93    410      3   -0.2   1.00   0.94
PIT    Jeff Cox             230   0.98    399      2    1.8   1.04   0.93
LAN    Rich Donnelly        260   0.90    370     10   -1.0   0.97   0.92
CIN    Mark Berry           217   0.98    315      4    2.4   1.08   0.91
HOU    Doug Mansolino       214   1.11    344      1    7.6   1.23   0.91
TEX    Steve Smith          234   0.95    410      9    2.5   1.06   0.90
ATL    Fredi Gonzalez       231   0.94    362      6    2.5   1.06   0.89
MIN    Scott Ullger         222   1.01    452      8    6.6   1.14   0.88
FLO    Bobby Meacham        199   1.05    359      5    8.3   1.24   0.84
CHN    Chris Speier         199   0.94    350      3    7.2   1.22   0.77

Under this second measure Cora moves from 30th to 11th by virtue of his team racking up a very poor EqHAR of -7.5 and rate of 0.81 in opportunities that Cora had little or no influence over. When comparing the 0.81 rate in his coach-influenced opportunities to 0.86, Cora comes out at 1.05 thereby slightly outperforming his team.

In Table 2 Washington and Gonzalez both look a little better while Speier and Florida's Bobby Meacham fall by virtue of their respective teams performing quite well in non-coach opportunities at 1.24 for the Marlins and 1.22 for the Cubs. And what of the Angels Ebel who came out on top in Table 1 in part I? He slides to 10th since the Angels recorded a very respectable 1.13 rate in non-coach opportunities while Tom Foley of the Devil Rays takes the top spot since his team performed so poorly in other opportunities (-6.6, 0.80) and so well when he was likely involved (5.3, 1.15).

This metric can be expanded to encompass multiple seasons and therefore a larger view. Table 3 shows these metrics for each of the 74 third base coaches employed from the beginning of the 2000 season through 2006.

Table 3: All Third Base Coaches 2000-2006

Name                     Opp     OA  EqHAR   Rate    Opp     OA  EqHAR   Rate  Ratio
Billy Hatcher            387      6    5.1   1.06    573     21  -12.3   0.78   1.35
Bill Dancy               527     15    3.4   1.04    737     17  -11.3   0.84   1.23
Michael Cubbage          494     12    4.7   1.05    706     15  -11.1   0.85   1.23
Lance Parish             189      5    0.9   1.02    243      8   -3.7   0.84   1.22
Cookie Rojas             221      5   -0.2   1.00    268      9   -4.6   0.83   1.20
Terry Bevington          439     12   -3.4   0.96    544     11   -9.2   0.82   1.17
Bobby Floyd              173      5   -2.7   0.93    316      8   -6.0   0.81   1.15
Jack Lind                211      2    4.7   1.10    273     10   -0.9   0.96   1.14
Tom Foley               1056     20   14.0   1.07   1609     43   -8.5   0.95   1.13
Dave  Myers              986     16    7.7   1.04   1463     35  -10.7   0.92   1.12
Al Pedrique              223      2    5.3   1.11    308      4   -0.3   0.99   1.12
Juan Samuel              626     11    7.3   1.05    976     23   -3.9   0.95   1.11
Wendell Kim              624     20  -14.7   0.88    980     34  -19.5   0.80   1.10
Jeff Datz                274      5   -0.7   0.99    400      7   -3.4   0.91   1.09
John Russell             672     19   -1.5   0.99   1096     24  -10.0   0.91   1.09
Mike Cubbage             244      7   -1.3   0.97    310      8   -2.8   0.91   1.08
Jim Riggleamn            270      7   -2.0   0.96    308     11   -3.5   0.90   1.07
Tom Trebelhorn          1323     32    6.6   1.03   2101     51   -5.9   0.97   1.06
Gene Lamont             1103     28    1.8   1.01   1730     49   -9.2   0.95   1.06
Eddie Rodriquez          475     11   -5.9   0.94    614     16   -6.7   0.89   1.06
Dino Ebel                238      3   10.3   1.19    373      9    5.2   1.13   1.06
Joey Cora                234      9   -7.7   0.86    404      9   -7.5   0.81   1.05
Joel Skinner            1087     27   15.5   1.07   1650     41    2.6   1.01   1.05
Ozzie Guillen            345     10    1.3   1.01    632     19   -2.1   0.97   1.05
John Vukovich           1130     33   -7.4   0.97   1491     41  -11.4   0.93   1.04
Tony Beasley             239      6    1.5   1.03    314      9   -0.3   0.99   1.04
Brian Butterfield       1195     24    6.1   1.03   1827     45   -1.9   0.99   1.04
Tim Flannery             683     18    6.5   1.05    710     20    0.7   1.01   1.04
Manny Acta              1032     17   15.3   1.07   1495     37    4.3   1.03   1.04
Ron Oester               407     11   -1.0   0.99    571     20   -2.4   0.96   1.03
Willie Randolph          976     20    7.4   1.04   1189     33    1.2   1.01   1.03
Ron Washington          1730     45    2.0   1.00   2272     40   -5.0   0.97   1.03
Carlos Tosca             712     13    0.6   1.00    969     17   -1.2   0.99   1.02
Dale Sveum               789     18  -20.9   0.87   1201     26  -18.6   0.85   1.01
Gene Glynn              1594     40  -20.0   0.94   2198     40  -15.1   0.93   1.01
Gary Pettis              379     14   -3.1   0.96    509     14   -2.5   0.95   1.01
DeMarlo Hale             248      5   -7.6   0.86    424      8   -7.6   0.85   1.01
Sonny Jackson            601     20  -16.6   0.86    896     24  -11.8   0.86   1.00
Al Newman                889     24    1.5   1.01   1384     28    1.1   1.01   1.00
Bryan Little             264      4    7.5   1.14    298      5    4.6   1.14   1.00
Luis Silverio            449      9    5.7   1.06    787     19    4.6   1.06   1.00
Mike Gallego             488      8    1.3   1.01    728     19    1.5   1.02   0.99
Dave Huppert             240      4   -0.7   0.99    318      7   -0.2   1.00   0.99
Pete MacKanin            201      5    0.4   1.01    228      8    0.5   1.02   0.99
Steve Smith             1082     21    1.7   1.01   1697     34    6.0   1.03   0.98
Doug Mansolino           867     18    7.6   1.05   1260     20    9.6   1.07   0.97
Jose Oquendo            1616     33   25.9   1.08   2267     49   23.1   1.11   0.97
Carlos Garcia            226      6   -1.5   0.97    377     13   -0.2   1.00   0.97
Tim Raines               204      9    2.9   1.06    335      7    3.2   1.10   0.97
Rob Picciolo             704     11    3.9   1.03   1163     24    6.7   1.07   0.97
Jerry Narron             494      8    7.7   1.06    611     12    6.5   1.10   0.97
Glenn Hoffman           1541     42  -13.5   0.95   2019     47   -2.8   0.99   0.96
Sandy Alomar             487     11   11.7   1.11    683     15   12.6   1.16   0.96
Fredi Gonzalez          1249     25    3.7   1.02   2005     32   14.0   1.06   0.95
Rich Donnelly           1594     48   -4.8   0.99   2176     52    7.4   1.04   0.95
Gary Allenson            366     18  -12.7   0.81    510     19   -8.0   0.85   0.95
Rafael Santana           408      8    0.7   1.01    717     12    6.0   1.08   0.94
Tim Foli                 387     13   -1.2   0.99    502     15    2.9   1.05   0.94
Ned Yost                 590     21   -8.4   0.93    797     24    0.0   1.00   0.93
Jeff Cox                 847     23  -10.1   0.94   1384     22    1.2   1.01   0.93
Ron Roenicke            1538     40    2.9   1.01   1977     34   18.2   1.10   0.92
Ron Gardenhire           511     16   -0.4   1.00    479     13    4.3   1.09   0.92
John Mizerock            478     10   -1.0   0.99    790     13    6.4   1.08   0.91
Jeff Newman              207      4    2.7   1.07    359      3    6.1   1.17   0.91
Trent Jewett             354     10    2.5   1.04    454     10    6.2   1.14   0.91
Larry Bowa               495     10   -8.6   0.91    699      9    2.1   1.03   0.89
Mark Berry               684     18  -10.9   0.92    911     17    3.1   1.03   0.89
Scott Ullger             222      3    0.5   1.01    452      8    6.6   1.14   0.88
Rich Dauer               710     20    0.2   1.00    861     16   12.7   1.15   0.87
Matt Galante             592     19   -8.8   0.93    853     26    7.3   1.08   0.87
Luis Sojo                558     16   -6.3   0.94    718     12    5.8   1.09   0.86
John Sterns              206     10   -7.0   0.85    253     10   -0.4   0.98   0.86
Bobby Meacham            199      4    2.3   1.05    359      5    8.3   1.24   0.84
Chris Speier             860     22   -4.7   0.98   1158     15   24.0   1.22   0.80
Sam Perlozzo             254      5   -4.0   0.92    275      3    6.3   1.22   0.75

Here Billy Hatcher takes the top spot through his work as the Devil Rays third base coach in 2000-2001. Although his rate statistics for the two seasons (1.01, 1.10) were certainly above average, his team in non-coach opportunities registered rates of just 0.75 and 0.82. Speier, as the third base coach for the Brewers in 2000, Diamond Backs in 2001, and the Cubs in 2005-2006 had 22 runners nabbed in 860 opportunities for an EqHAR of -4.7 and rate of 0.98 while otherwise his team was thrown out 15 times and had a rate of 1.22 pushing him to the bottom of the list.

From an absolute perspective Dale Sveum registered the lowest EqHAR at -20.9 during his time with the Red Sox in 2004-2005 and Brewers in 2006 while Gary Allenson with Milwaukee in 2001-2002 had the lowest absolute rate at 0.81. In both cases, however, the poor performance of their teams buoyed their ratings. Cardinals third base coach Jose Oquendo had the highest absolute EqHAR of 25.9 in his seven years with Tony LaRussa while Ebel recorded the highest rate at 1.19 in his single season with the Angels. These absolute numbers indicate that over the course of seven seasons the range in terms of EqHAR is around 55 runs.

In answer to the first question we posed in part I, the act of waving runners around is quantifiable, albeit imperfectly with the limitations already discussed. The quantification in the above analysis passes the test of reasonableness and takes the following form. Third base coaches in the absolute sense seem at most to be able to contribute to just over one additional win or one loss (Sveum with the 2005 Red Sox recorded an EqHAR of -12.6 and Jerry Narron with the Rangers in 2000 was at +10.9) in the course of a season over what would be expected. Over the course of seven seasons that contribution grows to around two and half wins indicating there is a large degree of variability in play. However, judging a coach by that absolute metric is not necessarily equitable since it doesn't take into consideration the personnel the coach is working with. To correct for this a ratio that uses a baseline can be calculated and when that ratio is converted to runs, the range becomes -1.5 to +1.5 wins per season and -3 to +3 wins over the course of seven seasons.

Persisting the Wave

While we've answered the first question in the affirmative, does the difference we see between third base coaches in a single season indicate that there is a disparity in skill between these coaches?

The standard way performance analysts have approached a question like this is to perform year to year comparisons in an effort to see if the effect being measured persists. As it turns out, roughly two-thirds of third base coaches remain in the role the following season with a high of 24 in being retained from during the winter 2003-2004. Using the ratio calculated in the previous section, a correlation coefficient (denoted as r where a value of -1 indicates a perfectly negative linear correlation and a value of 1 indicates a perfectly linear one) can be calculated for each pair of seasons as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Year to Year Correlations in Ratio for Third Base Coaches

Year Pair   Coaches      r
2000-2001     19      0.34
2001-2002     20     -0.16
2002-2003     21     -0.10
2003-2004     24     -0.09
2004-2005     21     -0.02
2005-2006     19      0.31

From an overall perspective those 124 pairs can be graphed as shown in Figure 1.

As you can see from the graph in Figure 1 the data doesn't trend in any direction and in fact the correlation coefficient across all pairs of years is just .04. A value so close to zero is evidence that there is in fact no correlation. In other words, knowing a third base coach's ratio in one season gives you no information about what their ratio will be in the next. Further, the data is almost perfectly normally distributed which is additional evidence that there is little or no skill component evident in the data. This can then be interpreted as meaning that there is no discernable third base coaching skill that carries over from year to year and that therefore the answer to our second question is "no."

There may be several reasons for this negative result. Reminiscent of the ongoing debate over clutch hitting, the skill this metric is trying to measure may be much more subtle than the metric can deliver. Instead of a coach being "responsible" for up to +1.5 wins per season, his actual contribution to those wins may be a fractional part of that value and hence the variability component in the numbers we use for correlation swamps the skill component to a large degree. So there may indeed be a skill involved in waving runners around, but that skill is for all intents and purposes unimportant in the big scheme of things. The obvious dependence on his personnel would seem to support this.

Additionally, perhaps the metric is poorly designed and may not capture the skill at all though it exists. It could even be the case that there really is no skill involved in holding and sending runners (or if you prefer, there is no skill difference between coaches at the major league level) and the differential results we see can be chalked up to a combination of personnel (try as we might to disentangle it or due to turnover of the roster) and simple luck driven by anything and everything from the opponents defense to the weather.

Our quest for knowledge about the game is just as often informed by studies that show no effect as those that confirm our intuition. As for the influence of third base coaches in determining when to send and when to hold runners, the most we can say from this study (assuming our metric is relevant) is that if there is a skill involved, it is hard to measure and although the judgment exercised on the field can often make the difference in individual plays, it doesn't manifest itself on the larger scale of seasons.

Dan Fox is an author for Baseball Prospectus where he writes the weekly Schrodinger's Bat column. He also writes about baseball and other topics on his blog Dan Agonistes.

Neal Williams is the president of the Rocky Mountain chapter of the Society for American Baseball Research.